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Johann P. Arnason, Civilizations in Dispute.
Historical
Questions and Theoretical Traditions. Leiden/Boston: Brill,
2003.
Over the last decade of so, Johann Arnason has done a great
deal, often in association with the Swedish Collegium for
Advanced Studies, to revive civilizational analysis. In addition
to writing or editing books on the subject, he has published
major articles in encyclopedias on the subject. 1 He is an
Icelander who migrated to the Continent via Prague, then to
Germany, followed by immigration to Australia where he spent
thirty years of his career before returning again to Europe. For
much of that period Arnason was left-leaning, more intrigued
with Marx than Weber, serving on the editorial Board of Thesis
Eleven in Australia. A more attentive reading of Weber back in
the 1980s, however, seems to have awakened his interests in
civilizational analysis.
This book is a composite of five essays loosely tied together.
The main effort is to reclaim civilizational analysis as an
integral part of modern sociology. It is an attempt to link this
reinvigorated civilizational analysis to the classic theorists,
especially to the seminal essay of Durkheim and Mauss, and
the unsurpassed work of Max Weber. The book is a veritable
Who's Who of contemporary civilizational analysts, though
some remain unknown even in Europe. A related general theme
of the book is the displacement of civilizational analysis by
concern for "agency and structure" that emerged in modern
sociology during the last two decades of the twentieth century.
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The grand figures of Toynbee, Spengler and Voegelin get some
attention, but a student's first encounter of them here would not
be efficient. We have to take the subtitle of the work seriously,
"Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions." It is a
reconnoiter with a very broad cast of contributors that only a
deeply read person such as the author would readily know.
The five chapters carry the following titles: "The Rediscovery
of Civilizations;" "Classical Sources;" "Patterns and
Processes:" "Meaning, Power, and Wealth"; "Questioning the
West: The Uses and Abuses of Anti-Eurocentrism." Although
Weber's pioneering foundations are appreciated, greater credit
seems to go to S.N. Eisenstadt for keeping civilizational
analysis alive, albeit through his ambiguous and inclusive
ruminations on the "Axial" shift first brought to attention by
Karl Jaspers. The Axial Age transformation (defined here as
"the middle of the last millennium BC") gave rise to some
major civilizational
configurations centered
on
the
Mediterranean, but also India and China.
For some writers an important question is the relationship
between "modernity" (not very clearly defined) and
"civilization." A suggestion that seems largely to come from
Eisenstadt is that a "new civilization" has emerged, the
"civilization of modernity," that has been spreading in a
manner similar to globalization. According to Arnason, the
"issue is whether modernity should be theorized in terms of
advances and inventions within the framework of Western
civilizations, more or less open to replication by non-western
latecomers, or as a breakthrough to new civilizational
dimensions" (35). This formulation adds a layer of
interpretation to the longstanding question of whether there is
simply one civilization or many. Arnason favors the view that
there are multiple civilizations, defined in a Weberian or
Durkheim-Maussian fashion, or alternatively, "civilizations as
paradigms of the human condition" from the work of Jaroslav
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Krejci. This and many other notions of civilizations vie with
each other with no attempt to reconcile them.
The second chapter begins with Emile Durkheim and Marcel
Mauss, giving attention to their "Note on the Notion of
Civilization" published in 1913, rescued for English readers by
Benjamin Nelson, a founder and former President of the
International
Society for
the Comparative
Study
of
Civilizations. His translation of the Durkheim-Mauss essay was
published in 1971. 2
Durkheim and his nephew noticed that "social phenomena that
are not strictly attached to a determinate social organism do
exist; they extend into areas that reach beyond the national
territory or they develop over periods of time that exceed the
history of a single society. They have a life which is in some
ways supranational." 3 Accordingly they suggested that "A
civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a
certain number of nations, each national culture being only a
particular form of the whole."4 This point of view stands in
contrast to the traditional, more common view among
anthropologists and ethnographers who try mainly to identify
any distinctive cultural group, ancient or modern, and call such
a group a "civilization." Consequently the latter view does little
to advance the study of civilizations conceived as trans-local,
transnational entities that evolve processes and phenomena that
are more than local or regional.
Max Weber's approach to civilizations, Arnason points out, is
more indirect in that he spoke of "cultural worlds" and
"cultural areas" that have a regional basis, especially India and
China, as well as Western Europe. He notes that Weber's work
2
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3
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4
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on the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism probably
led him to his comparative civilizational research and the effort
to determine how unique the economic and legal patterns found
in the West were in "universal history." This leads to a
discussion of the "rationalization" process whereby various
components of culture are refashioned in more logically
consistent and value-maximizing configurations. There is
neither a developmental nor temporal organization of these
reflections on Weber, so that here and throughout the volume
we have comments, notes, and reflections on major figures.
On the other hand, in the chapter on "Patterns and Processes"
Benjamin Nelson's point of view and contributions to
civilizational analysis are attentively laid out. Before turning to
that, it should be noted that both Spengler and Toynbee are
discussed mainly as examples of historical concern for cycles
of civilizational rise and decline, elite formation, and attendant
processes. Still, Spengler is credited with focusing on the
decline of civilizations rather than just societies or national
groups. Arnason sees Toynbee's project as a negative reaction
to Spengler, though without directly confronting it. In
Arnason's view, Toynbee's "civilizations" are large-scale
societies with enduring identities. At the same time Toynbee
neglected Spengler's concern for civilizational "styles." In the
end Toynbee seems to present a comparative interpretation of
religions.
Franz Borkenau is then brought in as a "corrective" to the
excesses of Spengler and Toynbee. According to Arnason,
Borkenau had a more appreciative role of death and decay in
civilizations, along with recognition that "barbaric" elements
often played instrumental roles in both decline and
rejuvenation. The point seems to be that civilizational entities
should be seen as having life cycles and that civilizational
analysts need to study their patterns.
For this reviewer, chapter 3, "Patterns and Processes" is the
most interesting of these essays. The writings of four
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol61/iss61/11
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contributors to civilizational analysis are considered: William
McNeill, Benjamin Nelson, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Jaroslav
Krejci. Voegelin and the unknown Czech philosopher Jan
Patocka also get attention. According to Arnason, McNeill's
various discussions of "the rise of the West" serve to bring
back the notion of civilization in the singular. McNeill's
conception contains the idea that civilization in the singular
(meaning Western civilization) "expanded because most people
most of the time preferred the enhanced wealth and power" that
it provided, and the notion that such advances reflect "civilized
patterns" of society (126). The latter expression has always
seemed to me a rather provincial and unhelpful conception that
does little to advance our understanding of peoples or
civilizations. Perhaps it is for this reason that Arnason has
omitted any discussion of Elias's work on the "civilizing
process," so-called. Nevertheless, McNeill's critique of the
cyclical image of civilizations seems beneficial, along with his
understanding of some of the processes that aided Western
Europe in its cumulative march toward "progress." However, I
would have suggested that McNeill did not probe very deeply
into the cultural level of developments, especially legal
innovations, that produced structures and processes that added
stability and hence facilitated unparalleled political and
economic development in Western Europe. In his own
reflections on the fate of his book, McNeill grants that, "Being
too much preoccupied by the notion of civilization, I bungled
by not giving the initial emergence of trans-civilizational
process the sustained emphasis it deserved." 5
According to Arnason, Benjamin Nelson's contribution to
civilizational
analysis,
especially
his
concept
of
intercivilizational encounters, is a major corrective to the
enterprise. As a former student of Nelson's, I agree with that

5
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assessment and most of what Arnason says about Nelson. I
shall, however, suggest some modifications of Arnason's
analysis based on my contact with Nelson back in the late '60s
and '70s.
The author of Civilizations in Dispute is correct to say that
Nelson was opposed to the "uniformitarian" perspective (of
which multiculturalism is today often another variant)
according to which all peoples are everywhere and always the
same. Nelson believed instead that civilizations could be built
on entirely different "geometries" with radically different
conceptions of law, morality, reciprocity, and rationality. He
thought this was evident when one compared the West with
Islamic civilization, China or India, for they proceed from
contrasting axial assumptions.
Although Arnason is thoroughly conversant with Nelson's
work, it needs to be said that Arnason has a European and I
would say quite different conception of the role of "theory" in
sociology and the social sciences. Arnason's approach is one
that calls on the investigator to "theorize" any range of
phenomena according to pre-existing categories, that is,
categories found in the writings of other theorists which then
set the range of thing to be studied. Such an effort would
presumably lead to a "complete system." Nelson, however,
would not have used that expression and was strongly opposed
to system building. Nelson had very productive and cordial
relations with Talcott Parsons, but strongly opposed Parsons'
idea of a "social system" and the urge to build such an
intellectual structure. His approach was much closer to the
"theory of the middle range" of Robert Merton that always
begins with the historical and empirical differences.
Consequently Arnason's suggestion that Nelson's "framework"
is incomplete rather misses the point: Nelson neither wished to
create such a thing nor attempted to do so. What he did attempt
could be put in more systematic form and probably would have
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol61/iss61/11
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been had he not died unexpectedly at the age of 66, returning
from a visit to Tubingen on a train in September 1977.
I agree with Arnason that Nelson's notion of civilizational
encounters is an indispensable insight that represents a
significant advance for civilizational analysis. For Nelson the
idea was a sort of symbolic probe that could help us to discover
just where the differences lie between one civilization and
another. The question is, how do we examine such encounters?
What grid is available whereby we may productively compare
civilizational sectors (or civilizational complexes) in two or
more entities? Nelson had many ideas about this.
In his discussion, Arnason reviews Nelson's idea of "structures
of consciousness." This is a theme deeply embedded in
Western thought and of course recalls Hegel as well as Auguste
Comte's triadic phases of religious, metaphysical, and
positivist stages of philosophical awareness. Nelson's efforts
focus on religious sensibilities and suggest three distinct forms
of consciousness: "sacro-magical," "faith structures" and
"rationalized" structures of consciousness such as one finds in
the moral accounting system (casuistry) of medieval
Christianity that entailed a forum of conscience, the
confessional. As Nelson looked at China and the Islamic world,
it was evident that nothing like the last phase existed in the
other civilizations or their religious structures.
In the meantime, Nelson attempted to identify a set of
conceptual anchors that he thought had played an unusually
central role in the development of Western civilization. These
included such terms as nomos, logos, civitas, polis, conscience,
scientia and several others. He gave such a list of Latin terms
to a medieval Islamic scholar and asked him to supply the
Arabic equivalents, of which there were not many. In other
words, Islamic civilization was indeed built on a very different
"geometry" or symbolic landscape. The same was true of
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China. One of the best examples of this is the idea of
"conscience" for which there is no linguistic counterpart in
Classic Chinese 6 or Classical Arabic. Only in the 19th century
with the translation of the Bible into Arabic does the word
"conscience" (damir) emerge in Arabic. 7 Likewise, our most
cherished term, science, especially in its modern sense, was
something, as I have pointed out, not well cultivated in China
or the Muslim world. Joseph Needham pointed out long ago
that the concept of "Laws of Nature" is missing in Chinese
scientific thought. 9
Still more cogently, the comparative study of law within a
civilizational context, as Nelson and Weber suggested, would
reveal very different legal conceptions in other parts of the
world. It would reveal, as I also showed in a Nelsonian vein,
that the very idea of a legally autonomous entity, the
corporation, without which a great variety of public and
private activities would be greatly impeded or impossible, is
absent in the other legal systems of the world. 10 This obviously
relates to the current discussion of what lies behind
"globalization" and whether this is possible without several key
legal concepts found only in the West.

6

Chung-Ying Cheng, "Conscience, Mind and Individual in Chinese

Thought," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 2 (174): 3-40.
7

Oddjborn Leirvik, "Knowing By Oneself, Knowing the Other: Al-

damir," Human Conscience and Christian-Muslim Relations. (Oslo:
University of Oslo Press, 2002).
8

Toby E. Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and

the West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 2nd
edition).
'Joseph Needham, "Human Law and the Laws of Nature" in The
Grand Titration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969).
10
Huff, ibid, chapters 4 and 7.
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Nelson had a conception of "civilizational complexes," as
Arnason points out, that suggests "a segment of the
paradigmatic cultural patterns in the sphere of expressive and
instrumental production" in societies and civilizations. These
complexes, conceived in a variety of social and cultural
contexts, provide a powerful grid within which one can carry
out highly useful comparative analyses. In Arnason's view they
"open up a vast problematic" for future research.
In a word, civilizational analysis has not been without a very
useful set of conceptual devices that could have advanced the
enterprise far more than it has by neglecting Nelson's insights
as well as those of Durkheim-Mauss.
Following the analysis of Nelson's contributions, Arnason
considers other aspects of S. N. Eisenstadt's work. His
conception of civilizations is far more philosophical, placing
emphasis on "the combination of ontological or cosmological
visions" that seem to be embedded in civilizations (158). It
would seem that Eisenstadt's most significant contribution has
been that of opposing "functional analysis" in mainstream
sociology. He did this by pointing to the deeper, if more
amorphously shaped ontological and cosmological aspects of
cultural life that have been at play in civilizational entities as
distinct as the West, Japan or China.
Eisenstadt's early work concerns "empires" and only gradually
did he shift his focus to the Axial Age problematic and
civilizational development. More recently he has spoken of
civilizational "breakthroughs" and thinks in particular that the
West had just such a "breakthrough to modernity" which he
suggests represents a new kind of civilization. At the same
time, Eisenstadt's analysis lacks the clarity of Nelson's
analysis of the European breakthrough of the 12th and 13th
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centuries that Arnason highlights." He concludes by
suggesting that Eisenstadt's approach "raises meta-theoretical
questions of the most challenging kind" (176).
From this reviewer's point of view it is regrettable that the
author of Civilizations in Dispute next takes up the idea of
"civilizations as a paradigm of the human condition" suggested
by Jaroslav Krejci. This is an interesting idea but as a
contribution to civilizational analysis it lacks the cogency of
the other major contributors to the fields, at least as laid out
here. The discussion adds another nuance to the canvas without
aiding the task of giving civilizational analysis a steady vision.
Chapter 4 of the book is a long foray (127 pages) into
"Meaning,
Power,
Wealth:
Changing
Civilizational
Constellations." It seems likely that this essay ought to have
been published separately as a contribution in its own right. In
the present context it seems disconnected from the major
themes and thinkers of the preceding chapters. It represents
Arnason's own thinking, quite in another vein than the
trajectory one expected to come out of the survey of earlier
pioneers. It is mainly the idea of intercivilizational encounters
and a brief review of my own work on comparative historical
analysis of science that carries over from earlier discussions.
The cause of investigating intercivilizational encounters is not
advanced but identified as an obligatory starting point.
Otherwise the chapter allows the author to follow his own
muse.
The final chapter, "Questioning the West," takes up many
general themes that now confront those who enter comparative
historical studies of civilizations. The shift of interest towards
civilizational analysis that has broken out recently, especially
11

I have amplified the significance of this breakthrough in Huff,
ibid, chapter 4, especially pp. 127ff.
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since 9/11, brings to mind the sensitivities that always arise
when social scientists study "others" and report their finding to
"natives." Natives of whatever sort are not always happy with
what observers say about them. In our globalized world, all
sorts of others read what we say and take objection. For many
people around the world it is painful to recall that for the four
hundred years stretching from 1600 to the present, the Western
world has been ascendant.
Furthermore, the economic, political, and military dominance
of the Western world during that period has often looked
unjustified to observers of many persuasions. Europeans
around the world in those days were not always good visitors
or benign rulers. Nevertheless, there were real disparities of
intellectual achievement, especially in science and economic
development between Europe and the underdeveloped areas of
the world. Europe did pioneer developments in law and
parliamentary structures that became requisites for modernity
but which were absent outside Europe.
Recollecting all those disparities, now that Asia and "the
Pacific Rim" may be rising, has led to anti-European
sentiments. Arnason attempts to deal those disparate
assessments evenhandedly, while rejecting the extreme
versions of Euro-bashing that one finds in certain quarters.
Arnason gives the reader a wide panorama of considerations
along these lines from the Middle East to Japan and China.
Here again Arnason's extraordinary broad familiarity with
writers of many colors can be a feast for hungry readers.
It may be too soon to expect a more systematic analysis of the
many varieties of civilizational studies, but this volume is a
welcome addition to the cause of civilizational analysis. It is to
be hoped that those interested in this area will consult this rich
undertaking.
Toby E. Huff
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